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Lucas v. Murray City Civil Service Comm. 949 P.2d 746, 754 9 
(Ut. App. 1997), citing Bell v. Civil Serv. Comm % 
515 N.E.2d 248,252 (1987) 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal of right filed pursuant to Rule 3 URAP from a 
grant of Summary Judgment in favor of Appellee and a denial of 
Summary Judgment against Appellant by the Third Judicial District 
Court entered on February 5,2010 appeal filed March 2,2010. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the court correctly rule that Appellee was not a tenured employee of 
Draper City at the time he was terminated and thus not entitled to pre-
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termination due process rights including notice of charges, explanation of 
evidence and opportunity to present employee's side of story? 
2. The standard of review of the lower courts grant of summary judgment is 
for correctness, according no deference to the lower court's legal conclusion, 
and accepting the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the 
losing party." Macris & Assoc, v. Neways, Inc., 986 P.2d 748 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1999), Oman v. Davis Sch, Dist 194 P. 3d 1956 (Utah 2008). 
STATUTES, AND RULES AND REGULATIONS OF WHOSE 
INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE OR OF CENTRAL 
IMPORTANCE 
1. Sections 10-3-1105 UCA& 10-3-1106 See Appendix.l &2 
2. Section 3020 Probationary Employment Period Draper City Rules and 
Regulations 
MARSHALLING THE EVIDENCE 
Because this is an appeal from an order granting summary judgment, where 
the court accepts the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the losing 
party, there are essentially no negative facts to marshal. However, the core issue 
being whether Appellants temporary employment status was extended within 
Draper City rules prior to his one year anniversary date, the only arguably 
significant facts, which could be marshaled to show that appellants temporary 
status had been extended, are the affidavit of Lt. Russell A. Adair where he 
indicates that he verbally informed appellant of the extension (R. pp.86-87, see 
also pp 151-152)) together with Sgt. Chad Carpenters Performance Appraisal 
which indicates that Sgt. Carpenter "recommends" that Appellants probationary 
employment be extended (R. p. 151). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a decision of the District Court on motions for 
Summary Judgment where Appellee's Motion was granted and Appellants denied. 
1. Appellant was originally hired by the Draper City Police Department on 
October 16,2006 (R. p. 187). 
2. Following a one year probationary period, in February of 2008 Appellant 
was delivered a Personnel Action Form indicating that he had been 
approved by the Chief of Police and the City Manager as a Permanent 
employee and showing an effective date of November 4,2007 (R. p 3.) 
3. On March 3,2008 Appellant was verbally terminated and told and that as 
a probationary employee he was not entitled to be advised of the reason 
for his termination or to a hearing requiring the Department to justify his 
termination as required by the Draper City Rules and Regulations. (R. p 1 
complaint paragraph 8 Admitted by Appellee's Answer R.p.7 paragraph 
8). 
4. Following written demand for reinstatement and hearing (R. p. 4) on May 
1,2008 Appellant initiated this action seeking an Order declaring that at 
the time of Appellants termination that he was a Permanent Employee 
entitling Appellant to the procedures and protection set forth in the 
Draper City Code as well as UCA sections 78B-6-401 and 78B-6-408 (R. 
complaint pp. 1-2). 
5. On November 5,2008 Appellant filed a Motion and Memorandum in 
support of Summary Judgment (R. pp. 14-17) that was Opposed by 
Appellee on December 8,2008 (R. pp. 28-40) and denied by the court 
without hearmg on March 16,2008 finding "This suit is dependent on the 
fact of whether Plaintiff was a permanent employee or an at-will 
probationary employee when he was terminated." (R. p. 46). 
6. Following a period of discovery Appellee, on January 19,2010, filed a 
Motion and Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment which was 
executed on December 15,2009 (R. pp 292-300), the motion was 
opposed by Appellant on January 4,2010 (R. pp. 283-291). 
7. On February 5,2010 the Court without hearing granted Appellee's 
Motion for Summary Judgment (R. pp. 307-311) finding that there were 
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no genuine issues of fact to dispute that Appellant's temporary 
employment status was extended on September 23,2007 when appellant 
had been given verbal notice of an extension of probation by Lt. Adair 
(R.p.307, Adair affidavit R. p. 87 at para. 3) and further that appellant on 
September 28, 2009 had been informed that his Sgt. was recommending 
the extension of probation. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The court committed reversible error when it ruled that there were no genuine 
issue of fact to dispute that Appellant's temporary employment status had been 
extended, thus not entitling Appellant to a pre-disciplinary termination hearing 
with appeal rights. 
ARGUMENT 
Although the district court erred when it denied Appellants motion for 
summary judgment (R. p. 46-48) it correctly assessed the controlling issue of the 
litigation when it ruled that "This suit is dependent on the fact of whether Plaintiff 
was a permanent employee or an at-will probationary employee when he was 
terminated." (R. p. 46). The court denied appellants motion finding that Appellee 
had raised sufficient issues of fact to contradict the declaration of Appellant that 
"although he had been told by his Sgt that he was recommending an extension of 
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the probationary period he was also told that he would receive "written notice 
setting forth the reason and length of extension" (R. p. 27 para, 7). The fact that he 
was told he would receive "written notice" by his Sgt is consistent with the 
requirement of the City to extended probationary employment. The fact issues 
raised by Appellee and relied upon by the court in denying Appellants motion for 
summary judgment were the Affidavit of Mac Connole which did not contradict or 
deny appellants statement that no written notice was provided regarding the alleged 
extension of his probation or that the extension of probation was approved by the 
City manager (R. p. 35 para. 6), the Affidavit of Hazel Dunsmore, claiming her 
mistake in the preparation of a Personnel Action Form (R. p. 36) again not 
disputing that the City had failed to inform Appellant of the extension of his 
probationary employment as required by the city rules, and lastly, a Draper City 
Police Department personnel evaluation form (R. pp. 39-41) indicating that 
Appellants Supervisor informed Appellant that he was "recommending" an 
extension of probation. This recommendation is only the first step required by 
Section 3020 and requires the approval of the Department Head, the City Manager 
and the issuance of a letter informing the employee of the reason for the extension 
and the length of the extension. 
The Rules and Regulations of the Draper City Police Department set forth 
the procedure to be followed by the Department to approve and confirm permanent 
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employment status and the manner in which probationary employment may be 
extended provide: 
Section 3020 PROBATIONARY EMPLOYMENT PERIOD 
General Policy Statement 
Al employees, both full and part-time, are required 
to complete Probationary Employment Periods. The first 180 
calendar days of employment after hire or change or status are 
considered to be the "Probationary Employment Period" 
During this period of time, the employee's potential for 
successful performance will be closely examined. It is expected 
that the employee will also evaluate the City and position in 
term of his or her own personal needs. Employees are 
considered at-will during the Probationary Employments Period 
and may be terminated with or without cause during such time. 
3. Probationary Employment: Upon completion of 
the Probationary Employment Period, recommendation of the 
Department Head, and approval of the City Manager, an 
employee will become a full time or part time employee in the 
position for which he or she is serving. The Department Head 
shall notify the employee of the new status and document the 
event with a Personnel Action Form. 
4. Written Notice of Extension. Upon the 
recommendation of the supervisor and approval of Department 
Head and the City Manager, the Probationary Employment 
Period may be extended when the original period is not 
adequate for the satisfactory assessment of an employee's 
performance. In such event, the employee will receive written 
notification of the reason for and length of the extension. 
Public bodies are required to comply with their own rules and regulations 
and employees are entitled to rely on those rules Lucas v. Murray City Civil 
Service Comm. 949 R2d 746, 754 (Ut. App. 1997), citing Bell v. Civil Serv. 
Comm% 515 N.E.2d248,252 (1987). 
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There can be no dispute that written notice, after approval of the Department 
Head and City Manager, is required before a Draper city employee's probation 
may be extended (Section 3020 above). The ruling of the court in this case 
impermissibly and erroneously ignores the obligation of the city to comply with its 
own rules and regulations in the following particulars; a) there is no evidence that 
appellant was ever provided Written Notice of the reason for and length of any 
extension contradicting Appellants Declaration where he indicates that although he 
was told that his employment would be extended he was also told that he would 
receive written notice and the length of his extension (R. p. 27 paras. 7 & 8), b) 
although the Department Head (chief of police Mac Connole) submitted an 
affidavit indicating that he was aware "that in late September, Daniel Van Beuge 
was informed that, due to job performance issues his probationary status was being 
extended for six months."(R. p. 35 p.2 para.6) said affidavit does not establish 
compliance with Section 3020 because it does not aver that written notice was 
every provided Appellant, that the extension was approved by the City Manager, or 
that the alleged verbal notice of Lt Adair on September 23, 2007 (R. p. 87 para 3) 
was even approved by the affiant chief of police. Interestingly enough the 
supposed verbal notice of extension provided by Lt. Adair on the 23rd precedes the 
recommendation of extension by Appellant's supervisor on September 28,2007 by 
five days. This inconsistent time period could reasonable cause one to consider the 
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veracity of Lt. Adair's affidavit in light of the fact that Appellants personnel 
evaluation had not been completed and a recommendation for extension of 
probationary employment had not yet been made. 
The district court's ruling that there are no issues of fact regarding the 
extension of Appellants probationary employment is not only not supported by the 
evidence, which must be viewed in the light most favorable to Appellant, Maoris & 
Assoc, v. Neways, Inc., 986 P.2d 748 (Utah Ct. App. 1999), it is clearly opposite 
to what the undisputed evidence establishes, and that is that Appellee did not 
comply with its own regulations regarding the procedural requirement to extend an 
employee's probationary period. 
CONCLUSION 
The summary judgment entered in favor of Appellee, based on a finding that 
Appellee had complied with its rules and regulation in extending Appellants 
probationary employment, must be reversed and remanded with an Order requiring 
the court to grant Appellants motion for Summary Judgment. 
r 
DATED this^Pday of June 2010 
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Appendix 1 
APPENDIX ONE 
10-3-1105. Municipal employees — Duration and termination of employment 
— Exceptions. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), each employee of a municipality shall 
hold employment without limitation of time, being subject to discharge, suspension 
of over two days without pay, or involuntary transfer to a position with less 
remuneration only as provided in Section 10-3-1106. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to: 
(a) an officer appointed by the mayor or other person or body exercising 
executive power in the municipality; 
(b) a member of the municipality's police department or fire department who is 
a member of the classified civil service in a first or second class city; 
(c) a police chief of the municipality; 
(d) a deputy police chief of the municipality; 
(e) a fire chief of the municipality; 
(f) a deputy or assistant fire chief of the municipality; 
(g) a head of a municipal department; 
(h) a deputy of a head of a municipal department; 
(i) a superintendent; 
(j) a probationary employee of the municipality; 
(k) a part-time employee of the municipality; or 
(1) a seasonal employee of the municipality. 
(3) Nothing in this section or Section 10-3-1106 may be construed to limit a 
municipality's ability to define cause for an employee termination or reduction in 
force. 
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APPENDIX TWO 
10-3-1106, Discharge, suspension without pay, or involuntary transfer — Appeals — Board 
— Procedure. 
(1) An employee to which Section 10-3-1105 applies may not be discharged, 
suspended without pay, or involuntarily transferred to a position with less 
remuneration: 
(a) because of the employee's politics or religious belief; or 
(b) incident to, or through changes, either in the elective officers, governing 
body, or heads of departments. 
(2) (a) If an employee is discharged, suspended for more than two days without 
pay, or involuntarily transferred from one position to another with less 
remuneration for any reason, the employee may, subject to Subsection (2)(b), 
appeal the discharge, suspension without pay, or involuntary transfer to a board to 
be known as the appeal board, established under Subsection (7). 
(b) If the municipality provides an internal grievance procedure, the employee 
shall exhaust the employee's rights under that grievance procedure before 
appealing to the board. 
(3) (a) Each appeal under Subsection (2) shall be taken by filing written notice 
of the appeal with the municipal recorder within 10 days after: 
(i) if the municipality provides an internal grievance procedure, the employee 
receives notice of the final disposition of the municipality's internal grievance 
procedure; or 
(ii) if the municipality does not provide an internal grievance procedure, the 
discharge, suspension, or involuntary transfer. 
(b) (i) Upon the filing of an appeal under Subsection (3)(a), the municipal 
recorder shall forthwith refer a copy of the appeal to the appeal board. 
(ii) Upon receipt of the referral from the municipal recorder, the appeal board 
shall forthwith commence its investigation, take and receive evidence, and fully 
hear and determine the matter which relates to the cause for the discharge, 
suspension, or transfer. 
(4) An employee who is the subject of the discharge, suspension, or transfer 
may: 
(a) appear in person and be represented by counsel; 
(b) have a public hearing; 
(c) confront the witness whose testimony is to be considered; and 
(d) examine the evidence to be considered by the appeal board. 
(5) (a) (i) Each decision of the appeal board shall be by secret ballot, and shall 
be certified to the recorder within 15 days from the date the matter is referred to it, 
13 
except as provided in Subsection (5)(a)(ii). 
(ii) For good cause, the board may extend the 15-day period under Subsection 
(5)(a)(i) to a maximum of 60 days, if the employee and municipality both consent. 
(b) If it finds in favor of the employee, the board shall provide that the 
employee shall receive: 
(i) the employee's salary for the period of time during which the employee is 
discharged or suspended without pay; or 
(ii) any deficiency in salary for the period during which the employee was 
transferred to a position of less remuneration. 
(6) (a) A final action or order of the appeal board may be reviewed by the Court 
of Appeals by filing with that court a petition for review. 
(b) Each petition under Subsection (6Xa) shall be filed within 30 days after the 
issuance of the final action or order of the appeal board. 
(c) The Court of Appeals1 review shall be on the record of the appeal board and 
for the 
purpose of determining if the appeal board abused its discretion or exceeded its 
authority. 
(7) (a) The method and manner of choosing the members of the appeal board, 
the number of members, the designation of their terms of office, and the procedure 
for conducting an appeal and the standard of review shall be prescribed by the 
governing body of each municipality by ordinance. 
(b) For a municipality operating under a form of government other than a 
council-mayor form under Chapter 3b, Part 2, Council-Mayor Form of Municipal 
Government, an ordinance adopted under Subsection (7)(a) may provide that the 
governing body of the municipality shall serve as the appeal board. 
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